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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the important issues states must face in developing a tort system
based on comparative fault is, in a multi-defendant case, who should bear the
burden of the damages that are unsatisfied because of an insolvent defendant.
Recently, in Gustafson v. Benda,' the Missouri Supreme Court enlarged its
commitment to comparative fault principles when it implemented "insofar as
possible" the Uniform Comparative Fault Act, a comprehensive system of
comparative fault. 2 The Missouri Supreme Court maintains that a comprehen-
1. 661 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1983) (en banc).
2. 661 S.W.2d 11, 15 (Mo. 1983) (en banc); UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT AcT
§§ 1-6, 12 U.L.A. 35-45 (Supp. 1984) [hereinafter cited as UCFA]. The Uniform Act
chooses pure comparative negligence over one of the modified plans. Id., § 1 at 36; see
infra note 58. The Uniform Act also provides for contribution among tortfeasors based
on relative fault. Id., §§ 4 at 42, 5 at 43. In addition it approaches set-off and settle-
ment based on relative fault. Id., §§ 3 at 41, 6 at 45. Although it retains joint and
several liability, id., § 2(c), it tempers the harshness of the doctrine by allowing for
reallocation of the uncollectible portion of the judgment between all culpable parties,
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sive system of comparative, fault is compelled by the principle of fairness,
which calls for the distribution of tort liability on the basis of relative fault.3
Yet, in Gustafson, the court also reaffirmed its commitment to the traditional
common law doctrine of joint and several liability, which places the burden of
the unsatisfied portion of the judgment on the solvent defendants, without re-
gard to relative fault.4 In retaining joint and several liability, the court appar-
ently rejected the modifications proposed by the Uniform Act that distribute
responsibility for any uncollectible portion of a loss between all remaining par-
ties, including a culpable plaintiff, based on their relative fault., Joint and
several liability is not true to the principle of fairness upon which the system
of comparative fault is built, and thus, the better method of distributing the
uncollectible portion of a loss is that proposed by the Uniform Act.
II. METHODS OF DISTRIBUTING THE UNCOLLECTIBLE PORTION OF A Loss
There are three methods of distributing the uncollectible portion of a loss
caused by a defendant's insolvency. First, joint and several liability shifts the
risk of insolvency to the defendants. Second, several liability leaves the risk of
insolvency with the plaintiff. Finally, there is a compromise position that dis-
tributes the risk between plaintiff and defendants based on their relative fault.
Joint and several liability imposes liability upon each responsible defen-
dant for the entire loss sustained by the plaintiff.' It is most commonly applied
including the plaintiff. Id., § 2(d) and Commissioners' comment. See infra notes 105-
11 and accompanying text. See generally H. WOODS, COMPARATIVE FAULT § 22-1 et
seq. (1978 and Supp. 1984); Miller, Extending the Fairness Principle of Li and Amer-
ican Motorcycle: Adoption of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act, 14 PAC. L.J. 835
(1983); Wade, Uniform Comparative Fault Act: What Should It Provide?, 10 U.
MIcH. J.L. REF. 220 (1977).
The court in Gustafson adopted the Uniform Act only "insofar as is possible." 661
S.W.2d at 15. Because the legislature had recently passed a statute in conflict with § 6
of the Act, concerning releases, the court pointed out that it was bound to follow the
new statute. Id. at 15 n.10. Compare Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.060 (Vernon 1984) (re-
lease reduces claim by amount of consideration paid) with UCFA, § 6, 12 U.L.A. 35,
44 (Supp. 1984) (release reduces claim by amount of the released person's equitable
share of the obligation).
3. See Gustafson v. Benda, 661 S.W.2d 11, 15 (Mo. 1983) (en banc) (experi-
ence with the application of "comparative fault fully demonstrates that fairness and
justice can best be achieved through a broader application of that doctrine"); Missouri
Pac. R.R. v. Whitehead & Kales, 566 S.W.2d 466, 474 (Mo. 1978) (en bane).
4. Gustafson, 661 S.W.2d at 16 ("By this opinion we do not intend to impair
the existing right of a claimant to recover the total amount of his judgment against any
defendant who is liable.").
5. See UCFA § 2(d) and Commissioners' comment, 12 U.L.A. at 39-40
(Supp. 1984). See generally Comment, Abrogation of Joint and Several Liability:
Should Missouri Be Next in Line?, 52 UMKC L. REV. 72 (1983); see also, H. WOODS,
COMPARATIVE FAULT 368 (Supp. 1984) ("The Missouri Supreme Court made it clear
that it did not intend to abrogate joint and several liability.").
6. See generally 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 10.1 (1956);
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 291-323 (4th ed. 1971); Jackson,
[Vol. 50
2
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 50, Iss. 3 [1985], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol50/iss3/5
JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY
where two or more persons proximately cause the same indivisible injury to
Joint Torts and Several Liability, 17 TEX. L. REv. 399 (1939); Prosser, Joint Torts
and Several Liability, 25 CALIF. L. REV. 413 (1937).
"Joint and several liability" is also referred to as "entire liability." See Jackson,
supra; Prosser, supra. This is more accurate terminology since each tortfeasor is liable
for the entire loss. Whichever term is used, the principle is a substantive rule of law
referring to the legal consequence of a joint or concurrent tort and should not be con-
fused with the procedural consequence of joinder associated with multiple defendant
cases. That two or more defendants may be joined in the same action does not necessa-
rily mean that they are jointly and severally liable. Joinder is merely a device for con-
venience and expedience and has little in common with the substantive liability of two
or more defendants for the same result. Prosser, supra, at 413. Early American courts,
experimenting with new liberalized joinder rules, however, often confused the two con-
cepts. See, e.g., Floun v. Birger, 233 Mo. App. 919, 296 S.W. 203 (St. L. 1927) (if
defendants are joined they must be entirely liable). The resulting confusion helped
shape the development of the doctrine of joint and several liability in America. See F.
HARPER & F. JAMES, supra, at 695-97; Jackson, supra, at 404; Prosser, supra, at 413-
21.
English common law recognized three general situations in which joint and several
liability was to be imposed: (1) where the actors act in concert, i.e., where the actors
knowingly join in the performance of a tortious act, sometimes referred to as a joint
enterprise; (2) where the actors fail to perform a common duty owed to plaintiff, such
as liability to joint tenants stemming from a failure to maintain their property in a safe
condition; and (3) where there is a special relationship between the parties such that
one is vicariously liable for the acts of the other, e.g., master and servant. F. HARPER
& F. JAMES, supra, at 692-93. The wrong under any of these situations is referred to as
a "joint tort." Joint and several liability in the first two situations is justified by the
notion that "the act of one is the act of all." Sir John Heydon's Case, 77 Eng. Rep.
1150, 1151 (1613); see F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra, at 694 (liability in the third
situation rests on notions of agency).
American courts, amidst the confusion of the new joinder rules, added a fourth
general category. They uniformly imposed joint and several liability "where a single
indivisible harm is sustained as a result of the independent, separate, but concurring
tortious acts of two or more persons." Id. at 693. Technically this latter category is not
a joint tort since it would not be fair under these circumstances to treat the act of one
as the act of all. The correct and better terminology for the wrong is a "concurrent
tort," and for the actors "concurrent tortfeasors." As a result of the liberal American
rules as to joinder as well as by "careless usage," American courts often refer to defen-
dants whose negligence concurred to produce a single result as "joint tortfeasors."
Prosser, supra, at 420. Today, when the term "joint tortfeasor" is used it usually means
that the defendants will be jointly and severally liable, but one must be careful since
the term is also used to refer to defendants who may be joined in the same action. See
F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra, at 693-94; see also Prosser, supra, at 413 (" 'joint tort-
feasor' means radically different things to different courts, and often to the same
court").
Unlike a true joint tort, the touchstone of a concurrent tort is that the harm must
be of "an indivisible nature which is not practicably apportionable." F. HARPER & F.
JAMES, supra, at 694. Where there is any reasonable means of apportioning the dam-
ages, courts will not hold tortfeasors jointly and severally liable. Id. at 694; see, e.g.,
DeDonato v. Morrison, 160 Mo. 581, 61 S.W. 641 (1901) ("fact that it is difficult to
separate the injury done by each from the others furnishes no reason for holding one
tort feasor [sic] liable for the acts of others with whom he is not acting in concert");
Miller v. Prough, 203 Mo. App. 413, 221 S.W.159 (K.C. 1920) (liability in proportion
1985]
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the plaintiff.7 In such a case, a plaintiff may collect his entire judgment from
any of the responsible defendants he chooses. For example, suppose as a result
of a three-car accident, the jury finds the plaintiff 30% negligent, defendant A
10% negligent, and defendant B 60% negligent. Under the doctrine of joint
and several liability in a comparative negligence setting, the plaintiff may seek
to recover 70% of his damages from either defendant A or defendant B. It
then would be up to the defendant who has paid more than his proportionate
share to seek contribution from the defendant who has paid nothing.
When joint and several liability is rejected, each defendant's liability is
limited to the proportionate share of fault attributable to him. The result is
commonly referred to as several liability.8 Thus, in our hypothetical, the plain-
tiff may collect no more than 10% of his damages from defendant A and must
collect the other 60% from defendant B. An action for contribution is not nec-
essary to apportion the damages among the responsible parties.
that the number of dogs owned by defendant bore to total number doing the damage).
Thus, the absence of any logical basis for apportioning damages was the principal justi-
fication for imposing joint and several liability on concurrent tort feasors. See F.
HARPER & F. JAMES, supra, at 694; Jackson, supra, 405-06, 408; Prosser, supra, at
442-43; Wigmore, Joint-Tortfeasors and Severance of Damages; Making the Innocent
Party Suffer Without Redress, 17 ILL. L. REv. 458, 459 (1923). The other commonly
mentioned justification for imposing joint and several liability on concurrent tort
feasors was more theoretical than practical. The reasoning was that since the acts of
each tortfeasor were a proximate cause of the entire injury it is not unfair to hold each
tortfeasor liable for the entire amount of the plaintiff's loss. See RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS § 874 (1968) ("each of two or more persons whose tortious conduct is a legal
cause of a harm to another is liable to the other for the entire harm"); Prosser, supra,
at 432.
7. These persons are called concurrent tortfeasors. See supra note 6. Concur-
rent torts may be subdivided into three general classes: (1) where each act alone would
not have resulted in a tort, but where all acts combine to result in a tort, the most
common example being an auto collision; (2) where concurrent wrongdoers commit
similar acts, each act being sufficient in itself to cause the entire harm, but which all
unite to produce one injury, a good example being where two persons independently of
one another start fires which combine to destroy plaintiff's property; (3) where each act
is sufficient by itself to produce some of the damage that was actually sustained, but all
combining to produce the total injury, an example being several companies polluting a
stream or causing a stench. Jackson, supra note 6, at 407-16; see also Prosser, supra
note 6, at 430-41 (listing nine circumstances under which joint and several liability
may be imposed).
For simplicity, this Comment focuses on fact situations from the first general class
mentioned above, and more specifically automobile accidents. The arguments made in
this Comment in favor of modifying joint and several liability are limited to situations
involving concurrent tortfeasors, in any of the above classes, but do not extend to situa-
tions involving true joint tortfeasors, see supra note 6, or those involving successive
tortfeasors. Damages by successive tortfeasors are severable in point of time and thus
courts generally refuse to impose joint and several liability. Jackson, supra note 6, at
419; Prosser, supra note 6, at 434-35.
8. See Note, Ohio's Comparative Negligence Statute: The Effect on Joint and
Several Liability, Absent Defendants, and Joinder, 50 U. CIN. L. REv. 342, 346
(1981). See generally Jackson, supra note 6; Prosser, supra note 6.
[Vol. 50
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As long as all parties are solvent, liability in either instance is ultimately
borne by the parties in direct proportion to their relative fault, either through
contribution or severally. But if any party is insolvent, the question of who
must bear the burden of the uncollectible portion of the damages turns on
whether the culpable party is plaintiff or defendant.9 Joint and several liability
thrusts the burden onto the solvent defendant, while several liability leaves it
with the plaintiff. Fault is irrelevant in apportioning the uncollectible portion
of the damages.
To illustrate, return to our hypothetical three-car accident, but now as-
sume that defendant B has no insurance and no assets. Joint and several liabil-
ity would permit the plaintiff to collect 70% of his damages from defendant A,
who is only 10% at fault. Because defendant B is financially irresponsible, de-
fendant A will be unsuccessful in an action for contribution since the insolvent
defendant has nothing to contribute. Thus, due to insolvency and without re-
gard to fault, defendant A alone must pay for defendant B's fair share of
liability. The result is reversed under several liability. Regardless of his rela-
tive degree of fault, the plaintiff alone remains responsible for the insolvent
defendant's proportionate share since the plaintiff can collect only 10% of his
damages from defendant A and insolvency prevents him from collecting from
defendant B.
A compromise position that splits the unsatisfied portion of the loss be-
tween plaintiff and defendant is possible. Commentators for some time have
espoused a scheme of apportioning damages that would reallocate responsibil-
ity for an uncollectible portion on the basis of relative fault,10 thereby elimi-
nating the all-or-nothing aspect of both joint and several liability and several
liability. For example, if in our three-car hypothetical the total damages were
$100,000, then $60,000 of the total loss would be uncollectible (the proportion
of fault attributable to defendant B. Because the plaintiff in our hypothetical
is three times as much at fault as the solvent defendant (30% vs. 10%), he will
bear three times as much of the uncollectible portion of the loss as the solvent
defendant. Consequently, plaintiff will be responsible for $45,000 and defen-
dant A for $15,000 of the uncollectible loss. Thus, plaintiff ultimately recovers
$25,000 from defendant A. Similarly, the Uniform Comparative Fault Act
distributes responsibility for the uncollectible amount on the basis of relative
9. See McNichols, Judicial Elimination of Joint and Several Liability Be-
cause of Comparative Negligence-A Puzzling Choice, 32 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 12 (1979);
Zavos, Comparative Fault and the Insolvent Defendant: A Critique and Amplification
of American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 14 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 775, 777
(1981).
10. The idea was first suggested by Professor Gregory. C. GREGORY, LEGISLA-
TIVE Loss DISTRIBUTION IN NEGLIGENCE AcTiONs 77-79 (1936). For proponents, see
Fleming, Report to the Joint Committee of the California Legislature on Tort Liabil-
ity on the Problems Associated with American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 30
HASTINGS L.J. 1465 (1979); McNichols, supra note 9; Miller, supra note 2; Pearson,
Apportionment of Losses Under Comparative Fault Laws-An Analysis of the Alter-
natives, 40 LA. L. REV. 343, 364 (1980); Zavos, supra note 9.
19851
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fault." The provision achieving this result, however, appears to have been dis-
carded by the Missouri Supreme Court in Gustafson when it reaffirmed the
applicability of joint and several liability.12
III. THE APPROACH IN OTHER STATES FOR DISTRIBUTING THE
UNCOLLECTIBLE LOSS
Only Minnesota has adopted as part of their comparative fault system a
provision splitting the risk of an insolvent defendant between all culpable par-
ties.1 3 Most states have retained joint and several liability in the face of com-
parative fault; however, their case law generally is silent as to the reallocation
alternative suggested by the Uniform Comparative Fault Act.
In American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court,4 the California
Supreme Court concluded that comparative fault did not require the elimina-
tion of joint and several liability.1 5 The court, however, limited its discussion to
a choice between joint and several liability and several liability; no mention
was made of a compromise that apportions the uncollectible loss on the basis
of relative fault.1 6 The decision reversed a well-reasoned court of appeals opin-
ion that had chosen to abolish joint and several liability. 17 The California
Court of Appeals concluded that comparative fault had eliminated the founda-
11. UCFA § 2(d), at 39. The Uniform Act achieves this distribution through a
provision for reallocation. See supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
12. 661 S.W.2d at 16.
13. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 605.01, subd. 5 (West Supp. 1983) (identical to
UCFA § 2(d) pertaining to reallocation). But see Ruberg v. Skelly Oil Co., 297
N.W.2d 746 (Minn. 1980) (reaffirming joint and several liability).
14. 20 Cal. 3d 578, 579 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978).
15. Id. at 582-84, 578 P.2d at 909-10, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 184-85. In American
Motorcycle, the plaintiff, a minor, sued several defendants in connection with injuries
suffered in a motorcycle accident. Defendant American Motorcycle Association
(AMA) answered, denying plaintiff's allegations and raising certain affirmative de-
fenses, including a claim that plaintiff's own negligence was a proximate cause of his
injuries. AMA also sought to file a cross-complaint against plaintiff's parents. AMA
argued that it should only be responsible for its proportional share of the damages on
two grounds: (1) that joint and several liability should be abolished and; (2) that there
should be contribution or indemnity in proportion to fault. Id. at 585, 578 P.2d at 911,
146 Cal. Rptr. at 186.
The court presented three arguments in support of joint and several liability: (1)
the plaintiff's injury is indivisible; (2) the plaintiff's conduct is not as tortious as defen-
dant's; and (3), present law allows injured persons to receive full recovery. See infra
notes 78-96 and accompanying text.
16. Justice Clark, in an extensive dissent in American Motorcycle, advocates a
modification of joint and several liability similar to that provided by the UCFA. "The
loss attributable to the inability of one defendant to respond in damages should be
apportioned between the negligent plaintiff and the solvent negligent defendant in rela-
tion to their fault." Id. at 613, 578 P.2d at 922, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 205 (Clark, J.
dissenting).
17. American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 65 Cal. App. 3d 694, 135
Cal. Rptr. 497 (1977); see Miller, supra note 2, at 849.
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tion for joint and several liability.18 The California Supreme Court substituted
contribution based on relative fault in place of several liability as the solution
to -the inequity suffered by defendants in multi-party litigation.19 The court
ignored the fact that this solution still saddles a solvent defendant alone with
the risk of an insolvent defendant.
In Lincenberg v. Issen,20 Florida's equivalent of American Motorcycle,
the Florida Supreme Court also ignored the possibility of any modification of
joint and several liability. Instead, the court held that it was bound by the
legislature's recent adoption of the Uniform Contribution Among Joint
Tortfeasors Act."' Since the act expressly provided for retention of joint and
several liability, the court reasoned that the doctrine should continue to be the
law of Florida.
22
In Artic Structures, Inc. v. Wedmore,23 the Supreme Court of Alaska also
refused to abandon or modify joint and several liability.2' Although the court
mentions the reallocation provision of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act, its
discussion centers on a choice between joint and several liability and several
liability.25 To justify its decision, the court points to California and Florida as
two important jurisdictions that had considered the issue and rejected any
modification of joint and several liability.26
In 1983, the Illinois Supreme Court confronted the issue in Coney v.
18. 65 Cal. App. 3d at 702, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 501 ("In a system where the
liability of several defendants concurrently causing an injury is based upon fault, the
conclusion is equally irresistible that the extent of the fault of each should govern the
extent of liability of each."). The court also argued for the elimination of joint and
several liability based on the social costs of retaining it. Id. at 703, 135 Cal. Rptr. at
502; see infra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
19. 20 Cal. 3d at 604, 578 P.2d at 915-16, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 198-99. Califor-
nia's system of contribution based on relative fault is called "comparative partial in-
demnity" and is similar to the system of contribution that is in place in Missouri. Com-
pare id. with Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Whitehead & Kales, 566 S.W.2d 466 (Mo. 1978)
(en banc).
20. 318 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 1975).
21. FLA. STAT. § 768.31 (1975). The Florida statute was an adoption of the
UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT, 12 U.L.A. 63 (1975) (1955 version).
22. 318 So. 2d at 393-94. It should be noted that the court also declined to
apportion contribution among tortfeasors according to fault because the statute ex-
pressly provided for pro rata contribution. Id. at 394. The statute was subsequently
amended to provide for contribution based on relative fault. § 768.31 1976 Fla. Laws
ch. 76-186 ***.
23. 605 P.2d 426 (Alaska 1979).
24. Id. at 435.
25. "Though the common law rule of joint and several liability does impose the
risk of uncollectibility upon the solvent defendants, we are not convinced that as a
general rule the alternative, which would cast the total risk of uncollectibility upon the
injured plaintiff, is an improvement." Id. at 431.
26. Id. at 432-35. The decision is also based on "Alaska's pro rata legislative
scheme for apportionment of damages among joint tortfeasors and the public policies
implemented by the legislation." Id. at 435.
19851
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J.L.G. Industries27 and likewise held that comparative fault need not eliminate
joint and several liability.2 8 The court's decision is based principally upon pre-
cedent from other jurisdictions.29 In addition, the court relied on the Illinois
contribution statute. 30 But like the courts of California and Florida, the Illi-
nois court limited its discussion to a choice between retaining and eliminating
joint and several liability. 1
Thus, while most jurisdictions have retained the rule of joint and several
liability, no court has discussed the possibility of modifying it. Instead, these
courts generally rely on the fact that other courts have retained the traditional
rule of joint and several liability despite the adoption of comparative fault.8 2
27. 97 I11. 2d 104, 454 N.E.2d 197 (1983). The court also held: (1) that com-
parative fault should be applied in a strict liability products case; and (2) that retention
of joint and several liability within the context of comparative fault did not violate the
equal protection clause of the United States and Illinois Constitutions. Id. at 126, 454
N.E.2d at 207. For a discussion of the case, see Gillan, Strict Liability/Comparative
Fault, 72 ILL. B.J. 543 (1984) (advocating the approach taken by the UCFA); see also
Cornell v. Langland, 109 Ill. App. 3d 472, 440 N.E.2d 985, (1982) (where the defen-
dant was found 82.5% negligent and 17.5% of the total negligence was assessed against
the "other person," the defendant tortfeasor is responsible for the total damages as-
sessed by the jury).
28. 97 Il1. 2d at 124, 454 N.E.2d at 206 (1983).
29. Id. at 121, 454 N.E.2d at 204-05.
30. Id. at 123, 454 N.E.2d at 205-06; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, § 302 (1979).
31.
Were we to eliminate joint and several liability as the defendant advocates,
the burden of the insolvent or immune defendant would fall on the plaintiff; in
that circumstance, plaintiff's damages would be reduced beyond the percent-
age of fault attributable to him. We do not believe the doctrine of compara-
tive negligence requires this further reduction. Nor do we believe this burden
is the price plaintiffs must pay for being relieved of the contributory negli-
gence bar.
97 II1. 2d at 123, 454 N.E.2d at 205.
32. In Colorado, one appellate court held, with little discussion, that the Colo-
rado rule of joint and several liability and the rule of no contribution among tortfeasors
should continue to be the law; the court simply noted that such a change "is not within
the province of this court." Stefanich v. Martinez, 39 Colo. App. 500, 570 P.2d 554
(1977), afid, 195 Colo. 341, 577 P.2d 1099 (1978). However, there is a vigorous dis-
sent supporting both contribution based on relative fault and the elimination of joint
and several liability. Id. at 555-57 (Van Cise, J., dissenting) (the underlying policy of
comparative fault is contrary to joint and several liability).
Other jurisdictions retaining joint and several liability in comparative fault sys-
tems include: Arkansas, ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-1001 to 34-1009 (1981); Connecticut,
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572 (West Supp. 1982); Georgia, Gazaway v. Nicholson,
190 Ga. 345, 9 S.E.2d 154 (1940); Idaho, Tucker v. Union Oil Co., 100 Idaho 590, 603
P.2d 156 (1979) (overruled on other grounds, Runcorn v. Shearer Lumber Products,
107 Idaho 389, 690 P.2d 324 (1984)); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 156
(1965); Michigan, Ferdig v. Melitta, Inc., 115 Mich. App. 340, 320 N.W.2d 369
(1982); Montana, Montana Jury Instruction Guides, Instruction No. 41.03; Nebraska,
Royal Indemnity Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 193 Neb. 752, 229 N.W.2d 183
(1975); New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.1 (West Supp. 1982); New York,
Kelly v. Long Island Lighting Co., 31 N.Y.2d 25, 286 N.E.2d 241, 334 N.Y.S.2d 851
[Vol. 50
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Several states have abolished or limited the application of joint and sev-
eral liability. Most of these states have done so by statute.3 3 Vermont, New
Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and Kansas all impose several liability on multiple
defendants using similar statutory language:
Where recovery is allowed against more than one defendant each defen-
dant shall be liable for that proportion of the total dollar amount awarded as
damages in the ratio of the amount of his causal negligence to the amount of
causal negligence attributable to all the defendants against whom recovery is
allowed.
34
Ohio35 and Indiana 38 have also statutorily eliminated joint and several liabil-
ity, but by a little different language. Statutes in Texas,37 Nevada 38 and Ore-
(1972); North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-07 (1973); Oregon, OR. REv. STAT. §
18.485 (Supp. 1984); Washington, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.22.030 (Supp. 1982);
West Virginia, Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 163 W. Va. 332, 256 S.E.2d 879
(1979); Wisconsin, Wisconsin Natural Gas Co. v. Ford, Bacon & Davis Constr. Corp.,
96 Wis. 2d 314, 291 N.W.2d 825 (1980). But see Soeldner v. White Metal Rolling &
Stamping Corp., 473 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Wis. 1979) (manufacturer-defendant respon-
sible only for own causal negligence; holding limited to instances in which plaintiff has
separate remedy against his employer); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-41(1) (1953).
Federal courts agree that the elimination of joint and several liability is not a
necessary consequence of adopting comparative negligence. McPike v. Die Casters
Equip. Corp., 504 F. Supp. 1056 (W.D. Mich. 1980).
While Iowa has followed the rule of joint and several liability, Drake v. Keeling,
230 Iowa 1038, 299 N.W. 919 (1941), the Supreme Court of Iowa adopted compara-
tive negligence in Goetzman v. Wichern, 327 N.W.2d 742 (Iowa 1982), and refused
"to decide in advance collateral issues which eventually may be raised." See generally
Humphrey, Haas, & Gritzner, Comparative Negligence in Iowa-The Time Has
Come For The Iowa Supreme Court to Put Its House in Order, 31 DRAKE L. REV. 709
(1981-82).
33. See Woods, supra note 2, at 226.
34. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258a(d) (Supp. 1984); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
507:7-a (Supp. 1984); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 7102(b) (Purdon Supp. 1984); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1036 (1979).
This language was challenged in Brown v. Keill, 224 Kan. 195, 580 P.2d 867
(1978), on the basis that the absence of the term "joint and several liability" meant
that the statute did not intend to eliminate the doctrine. The Supreme Court of Kansas
rejected the argument, unequivocally stating that "under the provisions of K.S.A. 60-
258a the concept of joint and several liability between joint tortfeasors previously ex-
isting in this state no longer applies in comparative negligence actions." Id. at 204, 580
P.2d at 875; accord Howard v. Spafford, 132 Vt. 434, 321 A.2d 74 (1974).
New Hampshire courts impose joint and several liability when the plaintiff can
only recover from one defendant because of immunities or other procedural bars. Si-
monsen v. Barlo Plastics Co., 551 F.2d 469 (Ist Cir. 1977).
35. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.19(A)(2) (Page 1981). See generally Note,
Ohio's Comparative Negligence Statute: The Effect on Joint and Several Liability,
Absent Defendants and Joinder, 50 U. CiN. L. REV. 342 (1981).
36. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-33-5 (West 1985). See Coca-Cola Bottling Co.-
Goshen v. Vendo Co., 455 N.E.2d 370 (Ind. App. 1983).
37. TEX. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, § 2(c) (Vernon Supp. 1984) provides:
Each defendant is jointly and severally liable for the entire amount of the
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gon 9 limit joint and several liability to those situations where the plaintiff is
less at fault than the defendant.
Two states, Oklahoma and New Mexico, have judicially eliminated joint
and several liability. In Laubach v. Morgan,'40 the Oklahoma Supreme Court
substituted a rule of "proportionate several liability" for the traditional com-
mon law doctrine of joint and several liability.4 1 The court noted that the basic
purpose of a comparative fault system is to attach "liability in direct propor-
tion to the respective fault of each person whose negligence caused the dam-
age."142 Consequently, it concluded that this purpose was inconsistent with
joint and several liability where one defendant may pay the entire amount of a
plaintiff's damages even though the jury may have determined that he only
caused 10% of those damages.4 3 The court considered both the California Su-
preme Court's and the California Court of Appeals' decision in American Mo-
torcycle. 4 The Oklahoma Supreme Court rejected the reasoning of the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court but found the California Court of Appeals' decision to
be "very persuasive. 145 In Boyles v. Oklahoma Natural Gas Co.,46 the
Oklahoma Supreme Court limited the Laubach decision to cases where the
plaintiff is a negligent party, thus establishing a dual standard for apportion-
ing damages for indivisible injuries in multiple tortfeasor situations.' 7
New Mexico has eliminated joint and several liability in all cases, even
judgment awarded the claimant, except that a defendant whose negligence is
less than that of the claimant is liable to the claimant only for that portion of
the judgment which represents the percentage of negligence attributable to
him.
38. NEv. REV. STAT. § 41.141(3) (Supp. 1984). This statute previously provided
for several liability in all instances. See 1973 Nev. Stat. 787, NEv. REV. STAT. §
41.141(3) (1973).
39. OR. REV. STAT. § 18.485 (1981).
40. 588 P.2d 1071 (Okla. 1978).
41. Id. at 1074. Laubach involved a three-car collision in which the plaintiff
was found to be 30% negligent, defendant #1 50% negligent, and defendant #2 20%
negligent.
42. Id. at 1075. It should be noted that Oklahoma did not allow contribution
between tortfeasors. Id. at 1074.
43. Id. at 1075.
44. Id. at 1075; see supra notes 14-19 and accompanying text.
45. 588 P.2d at 1075.
46. 619 P.2d 613 (Okla. 1980).
47. See generally McNichols, The Complexities of Oklahoma's Proportionate
Several Liability Doctrine of Comparative Negligence-Is Products Liability Next?,
35 OKLA. L. REV. 195 (1982); McNichols, Judicial Elimination of Joint and Several
Liability Because of Comparative Negligence-A Puzzling Choice, 32 OKLA. L. REV.
1 (1979). Professor McNichols prefers adopting contribution and retaining joint and
several liability to either proportionate several liability or the risk splitting scheme envi-
sioned by the UCFA. McNichols, 35 OKLA. L. REV. at 200; McNichols, 32 OKLA. L.
REV. at 16-17; see also Paul v. N.L. Indus., 624 P.2d 68 (Okla. 1980) (negligence of
nonparties will be considered in apportioning damages).
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those involving a nonculpable plaintiff.4 8 In Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding
Supply,49 a New Mexico court of appeals agreed with the Supreme Court of
Oklahoma's decision in Laubach and the California Court of Appeals' decision
in American Motorcycle.5 0 The court held that joint and several liability was
"obsolete" in a comparative fault setting.51 The case involved the negligence of
the defendant and that of an unknown driver, and the court concluded that the
right to contribution between the defendant and the unknown driver does not
answer the question of apportioning damages. 5 2 While Bartlett paid lip service
to the Uniform Comparative Fault Act,5' neither the Bartlett, nor Laubach
decision, like those decisions retaining joint and several liability, discussed
anything akin to the Uniform Act's provision that reallocates the uncollectible
portion of the damages as a viable option to the choice between joint and
several liability and several liability."
IV. THE MISSOURI APPROACH
The Missouri Supreme Court began implementing comparative fault
principles into Missouri's system of tort liability in 1978 in Missouri Pacific
Railroad Co. v. Whitehead & Kales.51 In Whitehead & Kales, the court
adopted contribution based on relative fault.5 6 More recently, in Gustafson v.
48. Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding Supply, 98 N.M. 152, 646 P.2d 579
(N.M. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that a truck owner, whose negligence was found to
have contributed 30% to the accident, was not liable for the entire damage caused by
such owner and by an unknown driver whose negligence was found to have contributed
to extent of 70%), cert. denied, 98 N.M. 336, 648 P.2d 794 (1982).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 156, 646 P.2d at 583. The court also examined and rejected the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court's decision in American Motorcycle, id. at 158, 646 P.2d at 584-
85, Florida's decision in Lincenberg, id. at 154, 646 P.2d at 581, and Alaska's decision
in Artic Structures, id. at 155, 646 P.2d at 582-83. See supra notes 14-27 and accom-
panying text discussing these decisions.
51. 98 N.M. at 158, 646 P.2d at 585.
52. Id. at 155, 646 P.2d at 582.
53. Id. at 157, 646 P.2d at 584. The court merely noted that the UCFA re-
tained joint and several liability, but was silent with respect to the reallocation provi-
sion of the Act.
54. See Laubach v. Morgan, 588 P.2d 1071, 1075 ("There is no solution that
would not work an inequity on either the plaintiff or a defendant in some conceivable
situation where one wrongdoer is insolvent."). The court stated that it "must make one
of two decisions:" either allow comparative contribution with joint and several liability
or do away with joint and-several liability and "provide that multiple tortfeasors are
severally liable only." Id. at 1074.
55. 566 S.W.2d 466 (Mo. 1978) (en banc); see also Anderson v. Cahill, 528
S.W.2d 742, 749 (Mo. 1975) (en banc) (indicating that the court had the inherent
power to adopt comparative negligence, but deferring the matter to the legislature);
Epple v. Western Auto Supply Co., 557 S.W.2d 253, 256 (Mo. 1977) (en banc)
(same).
56. 566 S.W.2d 466 (Mo. 1978) (en banc).
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Benda,57 the court took a significant step toward constructing a comprehensive
comparative fault system of tort liability when it eliminated the absolute de-
fense of contributory negligence in favor of comparative negligence. 8 More-
over, in Gustafson, the court announced that "insofar as possible" future cases
should follow the Uniform Comparative Fault Act, a comprehensive system of
comparative fault.59
The Missouri Supreme Court's embrace of comparative fault has been
influenced by the philosopher John Rawls and his theory of justice.60 The
court, in Whitehead & Kales, indicated their guiding principle by quoting
John Rawls as follows: "In exchange for the opportunity of some undertaking,
we each promise all others that we will be liable for the damage which our
own negligence in the undertaking has caused." '6 1 This is the principle of fair-
ness upon which the court has built Missouri's system of comparative fault.
62
57. 661 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1983) (en banc).
58. Id. at 16. Traditionally, in negligence actions, any contributory negligence
by the plaintiff was an absolute defense which barred recovery. Comparative negligence
is a method of dividing damages when the plaintiff has been contributorily negligent.
Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MICH. L. REV. 465 (1953). States adopting com-
parative negligence can be divided into two general classes: those adopting a pure form
of comparative negligence, and those adopting a modified form of comparative negli-
gence. Under a pure form of comparative negligence, the plaintiff's contributory negli-
gence is never a bar to recovery, but merely diminishes such recovery in proportion to
the percentage of negligence attributable to the plaintiff. Missouri adopted the pure
form in Gustafson, 661 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1983) (en banc). See supra note 2. It is the
favorite of most commentators. See, e.g., Leflar, Comments on Maki v. Frelik, 21
VAND. L. REV. 889, 918 (1968); UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT, 12 U.L.A. 34-45
(Supp. 1984); Prosser, supra; V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE 349 (1974).
Moreover, the four most populous states have adopted pure comparative negligence.
See Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 532 P.2d 1226 (1975);
Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973); Alvis v. Ribar, 85 II. 2d 1, 421 N.E.2d
886 (1981); N.Y. LAWS § 1411 (McKinney Supp. 1984).
Under modified forms of comparative negligence, plaintiff's contributory negli-
gence, if great enough, will bar recovery, otherwise plaintiff's recovery is reduced by his
proportionate share of fault. Most modified plans are legislatively adopted. There are
three variations. Plaintiff recovers if his negligence is "not as great as" defendant's, see
e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258a (Supp. 1984); plaintiff recovers if his negligence is
"not greater than" defendant's, see, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, §§ 11, 12 (West
Supp. 1984); plaintiff recovers if his negligence is "slight" and the negligence of the
defendant was "gross in comparison," see NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1151 (1975). See gen-
erally V. SCHWARTZ, supra at 43-83 (1974); H. WOODS, COMPARATIVE FAULT 77-90
(1978).
59. 661 S.W.2d at 15; UCFA §§ 1-6, 12 U.L.A. 35-45 (Supp. 1984); see supra
note 2.
60. See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
61. 566 S.W.2d at 469 n.4 (quoting J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 348
(1971)).
62. See Gustafson, 661 S.W.2d 11, 15 (Mo. 1983) (en banc) ("comparative
fault fully demonstrates that fairness and justice can best be achieved through a
broader application of that doctrine"); Safeway Stores v. City of Raytown, 633 S.W.2d
727, 732 (Mo. 1982) (en banc) (right to separate cause of action for apportioning
612 [Vol. 50
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Despite the fact that the arguments for modifying joint and several liabil-
ity rest on the same principle of fairness used by the Missouri Supreme Court
to justify contribution based on relative fault and comparative negligence, the
seminal decisions of Whitehead & Kales and Gustafson made it clear that the
court would retain the common law rule of joint and several liability.6 3 In
Gustafson, the court stated: "By this opinion we no not intend to impair the
existing right of a claimant to recover the total amount of his judgment
against any defendant who is liable." 64
The plain language of Gustafson leaves little room for arguing that the
court did not intend to reject the provision of the Uniform Act that calls for
reallocating the uncollectible loss between all culpable parties, even a plaintiff,
based on their relative fault.65 Certainly, the reallocation feature would "im-
pair" a claimant's right to recover his entire judgment from any responsible
defendant. In effect, reallocation would nullify this right by requiring a culpa-
ble plaintiff to return to the responsible defendants his proportionate share of
the uncollectible loss.
Bolstered by the principle of fairness, one possible argument against the
plain language in Gustafson is that the language was included to protect only
the right of an innocent plaintiff. Prior to Gustafson, the "existing right" of a
claimant to recover the total amount of his judgment against any defendant
resided only in an innocent plaintiff. Contributory negligence barred a culpa-
ble plaintiff from any recovery at all. Thus, decisions prior to Gustafson advo-
cating joint and several liability are inapposite since they are set against a
backdrop of contributory negligence and involved only innocent plaintiffs.
More significantly, a reading of Gustafson that limits the right of joint and
several liability to an innocent plaintiff is'entirely consistent with the Uniform
Act and the principle of fairness. Under the Uniform Act, the right of an
damages among tortfeasors not party to original action is based on principle of fair-
ness); Whitehead & Kales, 566 S.W.2d 466, 474 (Mo. 1978) (en banc); see also
Kendall v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 634 S.W.2d 176, 183 (Mo. 1982) (en bane) (Wel-
liver, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (principle of fairness deserves more
than mere lip service); Parks v. Union Carbide Corp., 602 S.W.2d 188, 191 (Mo.
1980) (en bane) (Welliver, J., dissenting) (must extend principle of fairness to achieve
consistency in tort liability) ("the converse of this principle, that one is not liable for
damage which he did not wrongfully cause, is the true basis of our relative fault sys-
tem"). Accord Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 813, 532 P.2d 1226, 1232, 119
Cal. Rptr. 858, 864 (1975) ("liability for damages must be borne by those whose negli-
gence caused it in direct proportion to their respective fault").
63. 566 S.W.2d at 474 ("Plaintiff continues free to sue one or more concurrent
tortfeasors as he sees fit and nothing that transpires between them as to their relative
responsibility can reduce or take away from plaintiff any part of his judgment."); see
also, Kendall v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 634 S.W.2d 176, 181 (Mo. 1982) (Bardgett,
J., concurring) (Whitehead & Kales explicitly retained joint and several liability). See
generally Comment, Abrogation of Joint and Several Liability: Should Missouri Be
Next in Line?, 52 UMKC L. REv. 72 (1983).
64. 661 S.W.2d at 16.
65. UCFA § 2(d), 12 U.L.A. 39, 43 (Supp. 1985).
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innocent plaintiff to recover his entire judgment remains unimpaired.6 6 The
principle of fairness requires only that a culpable party share in the tort
liability.67
Nevertheless, it appears that joint and several liability remains the rule in
Missouri. Joint and several liability has long been the rule in Missouri. 8 The
rule has been applied to joint and concurrent tortfeasors in multiple defendant
cases to make each defendant liable to the plaintiff for the entire amount of
the loss.69 The rule with respect to concurrent tortfeasors in Missouri is often
stated:
where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two or more
persons, although acting independently of each other, are, in combination, the
direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person, and it is im-
possible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury, either
is responsible for the whole injury, even though his act alone might not have
caused the entire injury.70
66. See UCFA § 2(d) and Commissioners' comment, 12 U.L.A. 39, 43 (Supp.
1985).
67. See Park v. Union Carbide Corp., 602 S.W.2d 188, 201 (Mo. 1980) (en
banc) (Welliver, J., dissenting) (joint and several liability should be retained only for a
faultless plaintiff); Steinman v. Strobel, 589 S.W.2d 293, 297 (Mo. 1979) (en bane)
(Donnelly, J., dissenting) (in the usual comparative negligence situation, tortfeasors
should be liable only severally and not jointly).
68. See State ex rel. Hall v. Cook, 400 S.W.2d 39, 40 (Mo. 1966) (en bane);
Electrolytic Chlorine Co. v. Wallace & Tiernan Co., 328 Mo. 782, 791, 41 S.W.2d
1049, 1052 (1931); State ex rel. Blythe v. Trimble, 302 Mo. 699, 706-10, 258 S.W.
1013, 1015-16 (1924); Applegate v. Quincy, 0. & K.C. Ry. Co., 252 Mo. 173, 198,
158 S.W. 376, 383 (1913); Berry v. St. Louis, M. & S. Ry. Co., 214 Mo. 593, 598, 114
S.W. 27, 29 (1908); Bragg v. Metropolitan Street Ry. Co., 192 Mo. 331, 359, 91 S.W.
527, 535-36 (1905); Newcomb v. New York Central & H.R. Ry. Co., 169 Mo. 409,
422-27, 69 S.W. 348, 352-53 (1902); Murphy v. Wilson, 44 Mo. 313, 322 (1869); see
also Shafir v. Sieben, 233 S.W. 419, 424 (Mo. 1921) ("no principle of law has a deeper
foundation or is more firmly established in this state than that every tortfeasor whose
wrongful act concurs in inflicting the injury is liable for the resulting damage").
69. "Joint tortfeasor" and "concurrent tortfeasor" have been used interchangea-
bly by Missouri courts to describe four species of conduct for which wrongdoers will be
hold joint and severally liable: (1) concert of action, (2) breach of a common duty, (3)
vicarious liability, and (4) independent, separate, but concurring tortious acts of two or
more persons causing a single indivisible injury. See Sail v. Ellfeldt, 662 S.W.2d 517,
525 n.4 (Mo. App., W.D. 1983); Stephenson v. McClure, 606 S.W.2d 208, 211 n.5
(Mo. App., S.D. 1980) (the term "joint tortfeasors" includes tortfeasors whose separate
but concurrent negligent acts caused the injury in question); Carr v. St. Louis Auto
Supply, 293 Mo. 562, 239 S.W. 827 (1922) (distinguishing joint from concurrent); see
also supra note 6.
70. Glick v. Ballentine Produce, 396 S.W.2d 609, 612-13 (Mo. 1965), appeal
dismissed, 385 U.S. 5 (1965); accord Barlow v. Thornhill, 537 S.W.2d 412, 418 (Mo.
1976) (en bane); Sall v. Ellfeldt, 662 S.W.2d 517, 525 (Mo. App., W.D. 1983); State
ex rel. Retherford v. Corcoran, 643 S.W.2d 844 (Mo. App., W.D. 1982); Brantley v.
Couch, 383 S.W.2d 307, 310 (Mo. App., St. L. 1964). The rule is especially applicable
to cases involving automobile collisions. See, e.g., McFarland v. St. Louis Cab Co., 282
S.W.2d 861 (Mo. App., St. L. 1955); Hensley v. Dorr, 202 S.W.2d 553 (Mo. App., St.
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The rationale, as is apparent from the rule, is two-fold: first, that each person
whose negligence is a proximate cause of the entire injury should be liable for
the entire injury,71 and second, that there is no logical basis for apportioning
the damages among the negligent defendants.
72
During their efforts to construct a comprehensive system of comparative
fault for Missouri, Judge Donnelly and Judge Welliver of the Missouri Su-
preme Court have penned dissents advocating a change in the traditional rule
of joint and several liability wherein they argue that the principle of fairness
embodied in comparative fault provides the necessary, logical basis for appor-
tioning damages.73 In Steinman v. Stobel,7 4 Judge Donnelly in dissent
presented his system of apportioning damages in a pure comparative fault set-
ting.7 5 Under his approach each party would be responsible only for his appor-
tioned share of the total damages.7 " While Judge Donnelly would borrow
freely from the Uniform Comparative Fault Act, he also noted that in the
usual comparative fault situation, tortfeasors should be liable only severally,
and not jointly.77 Otherwise, he reasoned, "one defendant could, in derogation
of the stated purposes of pure comparative fault, be apportioned a responsibil-
ity for satisfying damages greater than his own proportionate share of fault." 78
L. 1947); Ritz v. Cousins Lumber Co., 227 Mo. App. 1167, 59 S.W.2d 1072 (K.C.
1933); Gay v. Samples, 227 Mo. App. 771, 57 S.W.2d 768 (K.C. 1933); Mitchell v.
Brown, 190 S.W. 354 (Mo. App., Spr. 1916).
71. See Shafir v. Sieben, 233 S.W. 419, 424 (Mo. 1921); supra note 6.
72. See Daniels v. Smith, 471 S.W.2d 508, 512 (Mo. App., Spr. 1971); Daniels
v. Dillinger, 445 S.W.2d 410, 413 (Mo. App., Spr. 1968); Berryman v. People's Motor-
bus Co. of St. Louis, 228 Mo. App. 1031, 1035, 54 S.W.2d 747, 750 (St. L. 1931)
("[u]nless the damage caused by each is clearly separable, permitting the distinct as-
signment to each, each is liable for the entire damage. The degree of culpability is
immaterial."); Newcomb v. New York Central & H.R. Ry. Co., 169 Mo. 409, 426, 69
S.W. 348, 353 (1902). Where there is some reasonable means of apportioning dam-
ages, Missouri courts will not hold tortfeasors joint and severally liable. See Miller v.
Prough, 203 Mo. App. 413, 221 S.W. 159 (K.C. 1920) (liability imposed in the propor-
tion that the number of dogs owned by one defendant bore to the total number of dogs
doing the damage).
73. Steinman v. Stobel, 589 S.W.2d 293, 297 (Mo. 1979) (en banc) (Donnelly,
J., dissenting); State ex rel. Maryland Heights Concrete Contractors v. Ferriss, 588
S.W.2d 489, 492 (Mo. 1979) (Donnelly, J., dissenting); Parks v. Union Carbide Corp.,
602 S.W.2d 188, 200 (Mo. 1980) (Welliver, J., dissenting).
74. 589 S.W.2d 293 (Mo. 1979) (en banc).
75. Id. at 296-97 (Donnelly, J., dissenting). Judge Seiler concurred with Judge
Donnelly's separate dissenting opinion.
76. Id. (Donnelly, J., dissenting). Donnelly's scheme would consider the fault of
absent tortfeasors for the purpose of allocating fault upon a 100% basis.
77. Id. at 297 (Donnelly, J., dissenting). Judge Bardgett, also in a separate dis-
senting opinion in Steinman, called for the adoption of pure comparative negligence,
but his system would retain joint and several liability. Id. at 295 (Bardgett, J.,
dissenting).
78. Id. (citing Timmons & Silvis, Pure Comparative Negligence in Florida: A
New Adventure in the Common Law, 28 U. MIAMI L. REv. 737, 778 (1974)). For
illustrations on how Donnelly's system would work where one party has been released
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Judge Welliver, in his dissent in Parks v. Union Carbide Corp.,79 stated
that the rule of joint and several liability could no longer be justified by the
impracticability of apportioning damages among multiple tortfeasors. 80 "This
reason for the rule was completely eradicated by Whitehead & Kales, in which
the Court stated that instructing a jury to apportion the respective fault of
concurrent tortfeasors 'would present no insurmountable problem to the
jury."' 81 Judge Welliver stated that the principle of fairness the court had ar-
ticulated in Whitehead & Kales compelled an apportionment of the damages
based on the relative fault of the parties. a2 He concluded that the rule of joint
and several liability should be retained only in those cases involving a faultless
plaintiff since it is only to that extent that the rule of joint and several liability
is compatible with a system of relative fault.83 Thus, the dissenting opinions of
both Judge Donnelly and Judge Welliver rest upon the principle that liability
for damage should be borne by those whose negligence caused it in direct pro-
portion to their respective fault. Although the rule of joint and several liability
seems directly at odds with this principle, Missouri follows the majority of
states by refusing to pare the rule from its system of comparative fault.
V. JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED IN A SYSTEM OF
COMPARATIVE FAULT
Courts generally have advanced four arguments for retaining the rule of
joint and several liability. First, most other courts that have addressed the
issue have retained the rule despite comparative fault. Second, the injury is
indivisible and thus no logical basis exists for apportioning damages. Third, a
defendant's's wrongful conduct is more culpable than a plaintiff's. And fourth,
the law favors full compensation for an injured plaintiff.8 4
None of these reasons, however, justify retaining the rule unchanged.
or paid workers' compensation, see State ex rel Maryland Heights Concrete Contrac-
tors v. Ferriss, 588 S.W.2d 489, 492 (Mo. 1979) (Donnelly, J., dissenting).
79. 602 S.W.2d 188 (Mo. 1980) (en banc***).
80. Id. at 200 (Welliver, J., dissenting).
81. Id. (quoting Whitehead & Kales, 566 S.W.2d at 472). In addition to cases
involving comparative negligence or contribution, Missouri juries are instructed that
they may find punitive damages against several defendants in differing amounts, de-
pending upon differing degrees of culpability. See State ex reL Hall v. Cook, 400
S.W.2d 39, 42 (Mo. 1966) (en banc); MAI 10.03; MAI 36.12. Juries also apportion
damages in Missouri in Federal Employer's Liability cases. MAI 32.07.
82. 602 S.W.2d at 200 (Welliver, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 201 (Welliver, J., dissenting). As he had with Judge Donnelly's dis-
sent in Steinman, Judge Seiler concurred with Judge Welliver's dissent in Parks.
84. See American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578
P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978); Coney v. J.L.G. Indus., 97 Ill. 2d 104, 454
N.E.2d 197, (1983); Artic Structures v. Wedmore, 605 P.2d 426 (Alaska 1979); Seat-
tle First National Bank v. Shoreline Concrete Co., 91 Wash. 2d 230, 588 P.2d 1308
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Stare decisis, while persuasive, never justifies retaining a rule where the reason
for the rule has vanished.8 5 Precedent is only a starting point. A rule should be
frequently examined, or, as Mr. Justice Douglas warned, we let men long dead
and unaware of the problems of the age in which we live do our thinking for
us. 6 Unfortunately, Mr. Justice Douglas's warning often has fallen on deaf
ears; most courts retain joint and several liability with little or no discussion,
instead resting their decision on precedent. Moreover, as previously pointed
out, those courts that have addressed the issue, have done so without seriously
discussing the option of splitting the risk of insolvency between all the culpable
parties. Instead, these courts have framed the issue as a choice between retain-
ing and eliminating the rule.87 Re-examination of the rule in a comparative
fault setting reveals weakened justifications for its retention without change.
Joint and several liability can no longer be justified by the argument that
the plaintiff's injury is indivisible. 88 That a plaintiff's injury is "indivisible" is
simply a matter of semantics and merely restates a conclusion.89 An injury is
indivisible only because there is no logical or equitable basis for apportioning
damages among the defendants. But this is not true in a comparative fault
setting.
Apportioning damages is what comparative fault systems are all about.8 0
Nearly all tort claims are reduced to money judgments. The amount of dam-
ages is expressed in dollars and cents. Thus, the damage is divisible. The prob-
lem is finding a fair method of division. In instances of comparative negli-
gence, the jury determines the percentage of fault attributable to the plaintiff
and the percentage of fault attributable to the defendant, and apportions the
loss accordingly. Likewise, in suits for contribution, the jury determines the
relative fault of the parties and then apportions damages based on this deter-
mination. It follows that if the jury's determination of relative fault provides a
logical basis of apportioning damages for an indivisible injury between a plain-
tiff and a defendant and among defendants, it provides a logical basis for ap-
portioning damages between a plaintiff and multiple defendants.
The indivisibility argument rests on the notion that each defendant's neg-
ligence was a proximate cause of the entire injury.91 But the justification ig-
85. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 469 (1897). See
Parks, 602 S.W.2d at 199 (Welliver, J. dissenting) (quoting Holmes).
86. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REv. 735, 736 (1949); see Parks, 602
S.W.2d at 199 (Welliver, J., dissenting) (quoting Douglas).
87. See supra, notes 14-32 and accompanying text.
88. See Parks, 602 S.W.2d at 198 (Welliver, J., dissenting) ("No reason ap-
pears for characterizing tortious injuries as 'indivisible' except to rationalize continuing
the rule of joint and several liability.").
89. See Prosser, supra note 6, at 430, 442; 1 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 6, at
700-02; supra note 72.
90. See Zavos, supra note 9, at 788-89. But see American Motorcycle, 20 Cal.
3d at 588, 578 P.2d at 905, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 188 (the court drew a distinction between
apportioning fault and apportioning injury).
91. See American Motorcycle, 20 Cal. 3d at 589, 578 P.2d at 905, 146 Cal;
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nores the fact that the plaintiff's negligence was also a proximate cause of the
entire injury. Plaintiff's negligence no longer bars plaintiff's recovery. The in-
divisibility argument should not be used to allow a plaintiff to recover damages
of which his negligence was a proximate cause and against defendants to deny
modification of joint and several liability. If comparative fault is the logical
and equitable way of eliminating the all-or-nothing aspect of contributory neg-
ligence, it should also justify eliminating the all-or-nothing aspect of joint and
several liability. Thus, a more consistent approach would treat plaintiffs and
defendants evenhandedly, distributing the risk of an unsatisfied judgment be-
tween them.
The third argument for retaining joint and several liability also rests on
an unevenhanded treatment of plaintiffs and defendants. For this reason, the
argument that a plaintiff's misconduct is somehow less culpable than a defen-
dant's is unsound. The degree of plaintiff's culpability is less, it is argued,
because the plaintiff has only violated a duty to protect himself, whereas a
defendant has violated a duty to prevent harm to others.92 But often a plaintiff
in injuring himself will have created a tremendous risk of harm to others. To
illustrate, assume that A, B, and C all reach an open intersection at about the
same time, each is speeding and none is keeping a careful lookout. Assume
further that B and C are able to swerve and avoid injury, but A swerves into a
ditch and his car is badly damaged. Because B and C were lucky enough to
avoid injury, they may only be defendants in an action arising out of the con-
curring conduct of all three. Under the rule of joint and several liability, A,
because he will wear the label "plaintiff," is shielded from the risk that either
B or C is insolvent; B or C as "defendants" would have to bear the unsatisfied
portion of the damages caused by the others' insolvency. Yet there is no quali-
tative difference between the conduct of A and that of B and C; A certainly
created as great a risk of harm as B or C. The difference is that the risk
created by B and C was realized in the damage to A's car, while the risk
created by A was not realized except in A's own damages. Thus, the question
of who will bear the risk of an insolvent defendant turns on fortuitous circum-
stance rather than on any qualitative difference in the culpability of the par-
ties' conduct.93 An approach that apportions damages according to who is la-
Rptr. at 188 ("the mere fact that it may be possible to assign some percentage figure to
the relative culpability of one negligent defendant does not in any way suggest that
each defendant's negligence is not the proximate cause of the entire indivisible in-jury"); see also Comment, supra note 5, at 88-89 (arguing that eliminating joint and
several liability would eliminate the law of causation and be contrary to other funda-
mental tort principles). The author argues that causation and culpability are poor mea-
sures of fault, but never explains why these measures of fault justify comparative negli-
gence and contribution on the one hand, but not modification of joint and several
liability on the other. Id.
92. See id. § 65, at 418; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 463, comment b,§ 464, comment f (1977) (negligent conduct creates an unreasonable risk of harm to
others while contributory negligence creates an unreasonable risk of harm to the actor).
93. See Miller, supra note 2, at 852-53; Zavos, supra note 9, at 803-09 (offer-
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beled "plaintiff" and who is labeled "defendant," where the labels are
fortuitously attached, is neither logical nor equitable.
Perhaps the best justification for retaining joint and several liability is a
desire to make the plaintiff whole. This argument appeals to our sense of jus-
tice. A tort system must take care of those who are injured. This sense of
justice diminishes dramatically, however, where the plaintiff has contributed
significantly to cause his own injury and a defendant is only incidentally incul-
pated. This diminished sense of justice is recognized in the rule of comparative
negligence by reducing a plaintiff's recovery by the proportion of fault attribu-
table to him. Likewise, it would not seem unfair to have a culpable plaintiff
share the risk of an insolvent defendant. Moreover, it is clear that a defendant
is also injured and uncompensated when he must bear the entire burden of his
insolvent codefendant, beyond his proportionate share of fault. 94 While com-
pensation is a noble policy, it must be tempered by a sense of fairness and
logic, the cornerstones of a system of comparative fault. One person should not
be unfairly burdened to compensate another. Furthermore, compensation is
merely the flip side of liability and logically should be based on fault.
Obviously, a modification of joint and several liability that considers the
relative fault of all the parties would not deprive an innocent plaintiff of full
compensation.95 Before the trend toward comparative negligence it was easier
to justify joint and several liability. Joint and several liability grew out of a
system of contributory negligence, where a plaintiff had to be innocent to re-
cover anything at all. Therefore, courts were faced with shifting the loss occa-
sioned by an insolvent defendant either to an innocent plaintiff or a wrongdo-
ing defendant. Under these circumstances, the choice was easy. 96 Joint and
several liability permitted an innocent party full compensation. But in cases of
comparative negligence, the plaintiff is not innocent. Consequently, the princi-
ple of fairness is the strongest argument for not retaining the traditional com-
mon law rule of joint and several liability.97 The rule favors a culpable plain-
tiff over a defendant, or one wrongdoer over another. A principle of loss
apportionment that insulates a defendant from liability to the plaintiff for loss
due to the plaintiff's negligence should serve likewise to insulate a defendant
from liability for loss to the plaintiff attributable to the negligence of another
defendant. 98 One commentator has gone so far as to suggest that to hold oth-
erwise would violate the due process and equal protection clauses of the
ing several excellent examples to illustrate the point).
94. See id. at 800-01.
95. Concerning the relation of the policy favoring compensation of the innocent
plaintiff to the rule of joint and several liability, see Comment, Reconciling Compara-
tive Negligence, Contribution, and Joint and Several Liability, 34 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 1159, 1170 (1977).
96. See Miller, supra note 2, at 838 n.18, 842 (the law is loath to permit an
innocent plaintiff to suffer as against a wrongdoing defendant).
97. See Parks, 602 S.W.2d at 200 (Welliver, J., dissenting); Miller, supra note
2, at 844-45.
98. See Pearson, supra note 10, at 362.
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United States Constitution. 9
VI. SEVERAL LIABILITY PROVIDES No BETTER SOLUTION
Proponents of eliminating joint and several liability in favor of several
liability purport to rest their arguments on the principle of fairness. They ar-
gue that in a comparative fault system a defendant should be liable only for
the damages representing his proportionate share of fault. That is, a person's
share of negligence should not only determine the extent of his liability, but
the limit as well. 100 This argument, however, suffers from the same inherent
weakness as the arguments advanced by proponents of joint and several liabil-
ity,101 only in reverse. While joint and several liability shifts the uncollectible
loss occasioned by an insolvent defendant onto the shoulders of solvent code-
fendants, several liability leaves the entire loss on the shoulders of the plain-
tiff.1 0 2 Like joint and several liability, several liability apportions the loss with-
out regard to fault, only several liability unfairly favors a defendant over a
plaintiff, even an innocent plaintiff.
Advocates of several liability also point to the cost of redistributing loss
through joint and several liability.1 0 3 The California Court of Appeals in
American Motorcycle argued that shifting the loss of a negligent plaintiff to
the solvent defendant taxed an already overburdened "social fund."10 4 Ulti-
mately, the burden of the insolvent defendant is borne by taxpayers and pur-
99. Adler, Allocation of Responsibility After American Motorcycle Ass'n v.
Superior Court, 6 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 1, 19 (1978).
100. See Parks, 602 S.W.2d at 197-201 (Welliver, J., dissenting); Brown v.
Keill, 224 Kan. 195, 580 P.2d 867 (1978); Laubach v. Morgan, 588 P.2d 1071 (Okla.
1978); Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding Supply, 98 N.M. 152, 646 P.2d 579 (Ct. App.
1982). The court in Laubach offered the following additional reasons for a rule of
several liability: (1) it would eliminate the need for additional litigation of contribution
suits, 588 P.2d at 1074; (2) it would simplify the trial in comparative negligence suits,
id. at 1075; (3) comparative negligence adequately accomplishes the purpose of joint
and several liability, id.; and (4) Dean Prosser favored several liability, id. at 1075
n.17.
101. See supra notes 84-99 and accompanying text.
102. But see Boyles v. Oklahoma Natural Gas Co., 619 P.2d 613 (Okla. 1980)
(limiting several liability to cases involving a culpable plaintiff); Parks, 602 S.W.2d at
201 (joint and several liability should only be applied to a faultless plaintiff). Statutes
in Texas, Nevada, and Oregon allow several liability only where the defendant is less at
fault than the plaintiff. See supra notes 37-39.
103. Deep Pocket Getting Deeper in California, For the Defense, 6 July 1984
(joint and several liability claims accounting for an ever increasing portion of overall
claims costs).
104. 65 Cal. App. 3d at 702, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 502 (1977). The court first
pointed out that the rule of comparative negligence shifted a portion of the loss for-
merly borne by the negligent plaintiff to the social fund. The court concluded that it
would be a small trade-off from the plaintiffs standpoint that he rather than the socie-
tal fund bear that portion of his misfortune attributable to the insolvency of one of
several tortfeasors where the fund rather than the plaintiff now bears a part of the cost
of the damage to which the plaintiffs negligence contributed. Id.
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chasers of insurance, diverting resources from education, the disadvantaged,
and crime prevention.10 5 The court noted that the fixed costs of shifting losses
to the "social fund" is between two and three dollars for each dollar
distributed. 08
There are two rebuttals to the cost argument. First, when the cost is
spread out among taxpayers and purchasers of insurance, it represents only a
minuscule amount. Second, even if the cost amounts to a serious drain on the
"social fund," it is merely a policy judgment as to whether the resources are
diverted from needs more socially desirable than compensating plaintiffs for
their innocent damages.107
VII. SPLITTING THE RISK BETWEEN ALL CULPABLE PARTIES
If joint and several liability unfairly favors a plaintiff and several liability
unfairly favors a defendant, there is no apparent reason why both plaintiff and
defendant should not share the risk of uncollectibility according to their rela-
tive degrees of fault.' Such an approach rests on the principle of fairness
embodied in a comparative fault system. 09 Moreover, Justice Clark, in his
dissent in American Motorcycle, argued that any other approach also distorts
the fact-finding process."x0 Often the insolvency of one of the tortfeasors is
known at trial, and thus this tortfeasor is not joined or is unrepresented at trial
because of his insolvency. When joint and several liability is the rule, the
plaintiff will seek to increase the insolvent tortfeasor's share of fault since the
plaintiff knows that the solvent defendant will be responsible for his share of
the damages. On the other hand, when several liability is the rule, the opposite
is true: the defendant will seek to increase the insolvent defendant's share of
fault knowing the plaintiff will be responsible. If the uncollectible loss were
split between the responsible parties, this inflation of liability would stop."' It
follows that such a system would also encourage joinder of all the culpable
parties.
105. Id.
106. Id. (citing R. KEETON, J. O'CONNEL AND J. MCCORD, CRISIS IN CAR IN-
SURANCE 90 (1968); STATE OF NEw YORK INSURANCE DEPARTMENT, AUTOMOBILE IN-
SURANCE 34-36 (1977)).
107. See Zavos, supra note 9, at 781-82.
108. While commentators generally favor a rule that divides the uncollectible
loss between the negligent plaintiff and the remaining defendants, only Minnesota has
adopted such an approach, see supra, note 13. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 2; Zavos,
supra note 9; Flemming, supra note 10; Adler, supra note 91.
109. See Miller, supra note 2, at 861; Zavos, supra note 9, at 781-82; UCFA, 12
U.L.A. 35, 40 (Supp.,1984) (commissioner's comment to § 2) ( splitting the risk be-
tween all culpable parties avoids the unfairness of both joint and several liability, which
casts the total risk of uncollectibility upon the solvent defendants, and several liability,
which casts the total risk of uncollectibility upon the plaintiff).
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The Uniform Comparative Fault Act achieves a splitting of the loss ac-
cording to relative fault by: (1) ignoring the negligence of parties not before
the court;112 (2) retaining joint and several liability as to persons before the
court;113 (3) providing for contribution among tortfeasors based on their rela-
tive fault;11 and (4) calling for a reallocation of any uncollectible loss among
the culpable plaintiff and solvent defendants.1 5 The reallocation provision is
the unique feature of the Uniform Act, but unfortunately it is also the provi-
sion that the Missouri Supreme Court apparently rejected when it adopted the
Uniform Act and reaffirmed the principle of joint and several liability.11, 6 Sec-
tion 2(d) of the Act provides:
Upon motion made not later than [one year] after judgment is entered,
the court shall determine whether all or part of a party's equitable share of
the obligation is uncollectible from that party, and shall reallocate any uncol-
lectible amount among the other parties, including a claimant at fault, ac-
cording to their respective percentages of fault. The party whose liability is
reallocated is nonetheless subject to contribution and to any continuing liabil-
ity to claimant on the judgment.117
To illustrate how reallocation would work, recall our three-car collision
hypothetical. Assume again that the plaintiff is adjudged 30% at fault, defen-
dant A 10%, and defendant B 60%. Since joint and several liability continues
to apply under the Uniform Act either defendant would be liable for 70% of
the plaintiff's damages with a right of contribution against the other. But if
contribution fails because of insolvency, the defendant paying more than his
fair share may upon a motion made within a year of the judgment recover
from the plaintiff an amount that represents the plaintiff's proportionate share
of the uncollectible loss. Thus if defendant A paid $70,000 of a $100,000 judg-
ment, he could recover from the plaintiff $45,000, since plaintiff was three
times as much at fault as defendant A and the uncollectible amount of the
judgment due to the insolvency of defendant B was $60,000.1 The end result
logically and equitably apportions the burden of the insolvent defendant.
Clearly, the Uniform Act's reallocation scheme is objectionable to the
plaintiff's bar in a state like Missouri that follows joint and several liability
since plaintiffs can recover the full amount of their judgment as long as there
112. UCFA § 2(a)(2) and commissioner's comment, 12 U.L.A. 39, 43 (Supp.
1985).
113. UCFA § 2(c), id.
114. UCFA § 4, id. at 42.
115. UCFA § 2(d), id. at 39.
116. See Gustafson, 661 S.W.2d at 16.
117. UCFA § 2(d), U.L.A. 35, 39 (Supp. 1984). It should be noted that since
the jury will determine the proportionate fault of all the parties, the motion for reallo-
cation can be made at the time of the trial if the insolvency of a defendant is known
then or when this insolvency becomes known, but not later than a year after the judg-
ment is entered.
118. For more examples on how reallocation works, see commissioner's com-
ments to § 2(d), id. at 40.
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is a solvent defendant. But certain aspects of the scheme may also be objec-
tionable to the defendant's bar. For example, the reallocation provision applies
only where the defendant is insolvent; it does not address the immune or un-
available defendant. In addition, the burden of pursuing the non-paying party
is on the defendant. A defendant also faces the risk that the plaintiff will have
spent his judgment, be insolvent, and thus be unable to compensate the defen-
dant for his share of the reallocated loss. The risk would not be as great if it
were initially placed on the plaintiff. Usually a defendant is financially respon-
sible due to liability insurance. Thus, when a plaintiff finds that a defendant is
insolvent even a year later, a fund still would be available for reallocation of
the loss. A plaintiff will not have insurance for reallocation. A more palatable
scheme for the defendant's bar would make defendants initially only severally
liable and allow plaintiff the right of reallocation. ' 9 In either event, the reallo-
cation provision provides an equitable and reasoned means of reallocating the
uncollectible loss caused by a defendant's insolvency.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Unfortunately, the Missouri Supreme Court in Gustafson declined to
adopt the reallocation provision of the Uniform Act. The reallocation provision
corrects the harshness of joint and several liability by treating plaintiffs and
defendants evenhandedly. It provides a more equitable solution than eliminat-
ing joint and several liability in favor of several liability. The principle of fair-
ness, upon which the court rests its decisions to adopt contribution based on
relative fault and comparative negligence, compels the modification of joint
and several liability that is provided for by the Uniform Act. Missouri will not
have a comprehensive comparative fault system until the courts or the legisla-
ture modify the all-or-nothing aspect of joint and several liability.
GARY B. BREWER
119. See Pearson, supra note 10, at 364-65.
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